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Our aim is to transform the UK’s capacity for innovation. We invest in  
early-stage companies, inform innovation policy and encourage a culture 
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Foreword
The future prosperity of the UK depends on the country’s ability to foster and support growth 
businesses. The venture capital industry is ideally placed to be a cornerstone of this support and, 
though younger than the US industry, UK funds have already had some notable successes.
The financial crisis has hit all aspects of the private equity market hard, and this report shows 
that venture capital is no exception. With investment and fundraising slumping, it would be easy 
to become disheartened but our research highlights some promising signs. Successful exits have 
yielded good returns for funds even in the current recession; a good pipeline of investments 
initiated between 2004 and 2007 should bear fruit over the coming years and the introduction of 
the Innovation Investment Fund should help encourage investment in new businesses over the 
next few years. This year looks set to be tough but the industry has demonstrated its ability to work 
together to get the right level of funding to the very best growth businesses.
This work is part of a series of research projects led by NESTA which complements our own practical 
experience of running a venture capital fund targeted at early-stage companies. 
As ever, we welcome your views.
Matthew Mead 
Managing Director, NESTA Investments
July, 2010
3Executive summary
High growth, innovative companies are 
disproportionately important for economic 
growth in the UK. Venture capital is an 
important source of finance for these 
companies, one of the few sources with 
an appetite for risk that matches the 
uncertainty that comes with pioneering, 
innovative ventures and the ability to provide 
management support to take a company from 
initial proof of concept to mass market growth. 
This has seen venture capital act as a catalyst 
for new industries and ground-breaking global 
companies. 
And yet, the venture capital industry in the 
UK has been in a period of decline. This has 
been particularly true for early-stage venture 
capital as NESTA outlined last year. This report 
provides an update on the venture capital 
market in 2009, examines similarities and 
differences between the current crisis and 
the one triggered by the dotcom crash and 
considers prospects for a recovery. 
The venture capital industry saw further 
entrenchment in 2009 across all areas. 
Investment activity has now seen an overall 
40 per cent reduction over the past two years, 
the number of exits has fallen by 40 per cent 
and fundraising fell by over 50 per cent (both 
in terms of the number of new funds and total 
amounts raised).
The current crisis appears to have compounded 
issues that the venture capital industry was 
already facing following the dotcom crash. 
Two features particularly stand out about the 
venture capital market now: 
•	Fundraising in 2009 was the lowest seen 
in the past decade. Both the dotcom and 
financial crises resulted in a significant 
reduction in the number of new venture 
capital funds established. However current 
fundraising activity is considerably lower 
than levels seen after the dotcom crash and 
consequently it is at the lowest level seen in 
the last decade.
•	The time taken to successfully exit, 
through a flotation or acquisition, is 
getting longer. Across the world, the time 
taken to successfully exit through flotation 
now averages almost seven and a half years, 
the longest time seen over the past two 
decades. This global trend is reflected in the 
UK market. This obviously has knock-on 
impacts on returns which leads to making it 
harder for funds to attract more money in 
order to be able to invest in new companies.
The situation now would be far worse without 
public funding. Public funds hardly featured in 
the dotcom era but now they participate in 40 
per cent of all venture capital deals and 56 per 
cent of all early-stage deals. 
Even, at this stage, the fundamentals of the 
UK venture capital market appear to be sound, 
illustrated by the fact that funds are exiting 
companies with good returns in this recession. 
The recovery of the venture capital industry 
hinges on exits. As the economy recovers, and 
the merger and acquisition market returns, 
fund performance should stabilise and improve. 
The venture capital market appears to be 
well placed now. Following the dotcom crash, 
significant amounts of capital were invested 
in a large number of new companies (between 
2004 and 2007). These investments should 
bear fruit over the next few years and as funds 
successfully exit these companies, limited 
partner confidence in venture capital as a 
profitable asset class will return.
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Part 1: Introduction
The creation and development of high-growth 
businesses is vital to the future of the UK 
economy, because it is these businesses, and 
the entrepreneurs who create them, that are 
particularly suited to taking advantage of 
emerging technologies, novel business models, 
and new markets as well. For these companies 
to thrive, they need a financial architecture 
which offers multiple pools of capital with 
different appetites for risk. 
Venture capital – whereby capital is provided 
to the company in return for a shareholding 
in the business with the aim of generating a 
return through a trade sale or flotation – is 
an important component of this financial 
architecture, capable of nurturing of high-tech, 
high-potential companies. The positive impacts 
of venture capital funding can be seen in the 
disproportionate number of patents and new 
technologies generated by venture capital-
backed firms. These firms bring more radical 
innovations to market faster,1 and are more 
likely to spawn new industries.2  
Venture capital in the UK
Currently, after France, the UK boasts the 
second largest venture capital market in 
Europe, accounting for 21 per cent of all 
invested amounts.3 The UK performs worse 
when only early-stage investments are 
considered, lagging behind Switzerland, 
Sweden and the US (Figure 1). 
This comparatively low level of early-stage 
investments highlights one of the dominant 
trends in the UK venture capital market in 
the last decade, namely the shift of funding 
towards larger deals and more established 
companies. Venture capital has benefited little 
from the explosion in the value of private 
equity investments, which trebled between 
2003 and 2007 from £4 billion to nearly £12 
billion.4 Where expansion has occurred in 
the venture capital market, this has typically 
been driven by an expansion in later-stage 
investments rather than early-stage. 
The dearth of early-stage funding by private 
providers has prompted several UK government 
initiatives to improve access to finance for 
small high-growth firms. The government 
has attempted to address the supply-side 
problem by setting up a series of new funds, 
such as the High Technology Fund (2000), 
the University Challenge Funds (1999-
2001), the Regional Venture Capital Funds 
(2002), the Early Growth Funds (2004) and, 
more recently, the Enterprise Capital Funds 
(2005). These funds followed a variety of tax 
incentives to individuals and corporations that 
were introduced in the mid 1990s to draw 
more capital into the venture capital market, 
including the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(1994), the Venture Capital Trust (1995) and 
the Corporate Venture Scheme (2000). 
The current downturn spurred the introduction 
of the Innovation Investment Fund to support 
the provision of early-stage finance to new, 
promising firms. This new government-backed 
fund of funds initiative was established in 
response to the impact of the recession on 
the venture capital industry. First, falling stock 
markets and poorer trading environments have 
made it harder for funds to sell or float their 
existing investments. Second, several limited 
partners suffering from liquidity problems have 
been unable to fund further investments. Third, 
several institutional investors have reduced 
their exposure to the venture capital market 
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1. Kortum, S. and Lerner, 
J. (2000) Assessing the 
contribution of venture capital 
to innovation. ‘RAND Journal 
of Economics.’ Vol. 31, No. 
4, Winter 2000, pp.674-692; 
Hellman, T. and Puri, M. 
(2002) Venture capital and 
the professionalisation of 
startups: Empirical Evidence. 
‘Journal of Finance.’ 57, 
pp.169-197; Kaplan, S. and 
Stromberg, P. (2001) Financial 
contracting meets the real 
world: an empirical analysis 
of venture capital contracts. 
‘Review of Economic Studies.’ 
2002, pp.1-35.
2. See Bygrave, W.B. and 
Timmons, J.A. (1992) 
‘Venture Capital at the 
Crossroads.’ Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business 
School Press; and Timmons, 
A.J. and Spinelli, S. (2003) 
‘New Venture Creation, 
Entrepreneurship for the 21st 
Century.’ New York: McGraw- 
Hill.
3. EVCA data for 2009, venture 
capital investments include 
seed, start-up and later-stage 
venture. It excludes growth 
capital, rescue/turnaround, 
replacement capital and 
buyouts. According to EVCA, 
in 2007, VC investments 
accounted for €2.14 billion in 
the UK, €1.12 billion in France 
and €890 million in Germany; 
in 2008, €1.66 billion in the 
UK, €1.08 billion in France 
and €1.04 billion in Germany; 
in 2009, €854 million in the 
UK, €896 million in France 
and €669 million in Germany. 
4. In contrast, the number of 
companies that received 
private equity investment 
has remained fairly stable at 
around 1,300 over the same 
period (BVCA Investments 
Activity report, various years).
while others are leaving the early-stage market 
altogether.5 
With the current recession beginning to ease, 
this is a timely opportunity to examine how the 
venture capital industry faired last year both in 
terms of investment activity and fundraising. 
Additionally, examining how this crisis 
compares to the one that followed the dotcom 
crash also helps inform when a recovery might 
begin. 
8
5. NESTA (2009) ‘Reshaping 
the UK economy.’ London: 
NESTA.
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Figure 1: Early-stage venture capital investments as a proportion of GDP per country, 2008
Source: Eurostat
Part 2: Investment activity over the last decade 
The financial crisis, which began in earnest in 
2008, continued to severely impact venture 
capital investment activity in 2009. Every part 
of the industry saw retrenchment, from deal 
activity to time to exit. 
Comparison of the current and the dotcom 
crises highlights that investment activity has 
reached some of the lowest levels seen in 
the last decade, with seed and early-stage 
financing continuing to be particularly hard hit. 
In parallel, the time taken to exit companies 
has grown over the last two decades, last year 
hitting a historic high.
Investments activity by venture capital 
continued to decline in 2009
In 2009, the number of investments made by 
venture capital companies fell by 17 per cent 
compared with 2008. Only 266 companies 
received investments in 2009, down from 322 
in 2008 (Figure 2). As a result, the amount 
invested by venture capital funds in UK 
companies was only £677 million in 2009, a 
drop of 27 per cent compared with the year 
before, when £930 million was invested (Figure 
3). This follows significant falls in activity in 
2008.6
Venture capital funds have tended to focus 
their investments on their existing portfolio 
companies, so there was only a modest fall 
in follow-up funding. Instead, 2009 was a 
particulary difficult year for new companies 
seeking venture capital finance for the first 
time. Seed and first round financing suffered 
a sharp drop of 53 per cent in total amounts 
invested and 29 per cent in terms of the 
number of companies backed since 2008.
Investment activity is lower now than 
after the dotcom crash, with seed and 
first round funding being particularly 
hard hit
The collapse in investment activity in the 
current downturn has left the total number of 
companies receiving investment during this 
crash at the lowest level of the decade, even 
lower than that observed after the dotcom 
crash. Comparison between the two crises 
highlights some key findings:
•	In the two-year period 2007-2009, the 
number of companies receiving venture 
capital finance decreased by 38 per cent 
while the total amount invested fell by 37 
per cent.7 By comparison, there was a more 
radical decrease between 2000-2002 where 
the number of recipient companies fell by 54 
per cent while total investment was 77 per 
cent lower by 2002. 
•	With the start of the financial crisis (2008) 
the number of investments fell back 
dramatically to 2002 levels, dropping in 
2009 to the lowest level of the decade. Total 
amounts invested in 2009 were broadly 
similar to that seen in 2003 (Figure 3).
•	In both crises, seed and first round 
investments (first-time financing) have been 
extremely volatile. Between 2007-2009, total 
investment in seed and first round companies 
decreased by 58 per cent with 52 per cent 
fewer companies backed. A more severe 
drop was experienced between 2000-2002 
where amounts invested dropped by 90 per 
cent and first stage-financed companies 
fell by 73 per cent. The volatility of first-
time financing is clear as well if the full 
decade is considered. In ‘good years’ they 
9
6. BVCA reports on an annual 
basis the UK venture capital 
activity of its members. For 
2009, BVCA reported a drop 
of 18 per cent in amounts 
invested and 15 per cent in 
terms of number of deals 
(BVCA Investments Activity 
2009), broadly similar 
trends to those observed 
in the analysis above. The 
discrepancy in the reported 
figures may be explained by 
slightly different definitions 
of venture capital used and 
by the origin country of the 
investment. 
7. BVCA figures suggest a drop 
of 32 per cent in terms of 
amounts invested and 23 
per cent in the number of 
companies backed during the 
same period. 
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Figure 2: Venture capital investments, number of companies by stage, 2000-2009 
Figure 3: Venture capital investments, amount invested by stage (£m), 2000-2009
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tend to account for the majority of deals, 
peaking with 70 per cent in 2000 and 60 
per cent in 2006, while in the ‘bad years’ 
it falls, reaching the bottom in 2003 and 
2009 with around 42 per cent (Figure 22 in 
appendices). Later stages rounds tend to be 
larger, so they have consistently attracted the 
largest share of investment funding, with the 
exception of 2000 and 2006 when early-
stage activity peaked. 
Sustained levels of publicly backed 
investments 
Publicly backed funds have become 
increasingly important over the past decade: 
they participated in 42 per cent of all venture 
capital deals in 2009.8 Since 2005, there has 
been a broadly stable representation of the 
public sector in the venture capital market, 
after a significant increase in the portion 
of deals that are publicly backed following 
the dotcom crash (Figure 4). In 2002, deals 
involving a publicly backed fund counted for 
over 20 per cent of all deals while their share 
doubled to over 40 per cent by 2009. This 
has been driven both by falls in private sector 
funding and increases in government funding. 
Public funding is particularly prominent in 
early-stage funding.9 Only 20 per cent of all 
early-stage investments had public backing 
in 2000. Since then the increase in publicly 
backed deals saw funding peaking at 68 per 
cent of all early-stage investments in 2008. 
The proportion has since fallen back a little: in 
2009, 56 per cent of all early-stage deals had 
public backing (Figure 5).
This fall does not signal the return of private 
investments into the early-stage market, rather 
it reflects many government-backed schemes 
coming to an end (e.g Regional Venture Capital 
Funds) and the newly established ones (e.g. 
UK Innovation Investment Fund) not yet being 
fully operational (see Table 4 in appendices). 
Many publicly backed funds only co-invest 
with private funds and a decrease in private 
venture capital activity will naturally decrease 
the activity of those funds too. 
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8. Although not reported here, 
publicly backed funds were 
involved in deals that counted 
for 21 per cent of all invested 
amounts in 2009.
9. We define early-stage deals 
as investments involving 
amounts below £2 million and 
in funding rounds 1, 2 or 3. 
Figure 4: Venture capital deals by source, 2000-2009 
Source: for the years 2000-2008 Library House and for 2009 VentureSource Dow Jones, Thomson One and desk research 
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Business angels have partially stepped in
Analysis of business angel investors reveals that 
over the last decade they have become more 
significant in both absolute and relative terms.10 
Each year between 2005 and 2008, they were 
involved in more than 40 per cent of all deals 
in which public sector funds participated.11 
Although the actual number of Business Angel 
involvement in venture capital deals decreased 
in 2009 following the overall trend in the 
market, they continue to be important co-
investment partners. 
Deals in which one or more Business Angels 
participated were two and a half million pounds 
smaller than deals made by private funds 
solely.12 This trend is seen even when angels 
invest in later stages.
The total number of exits has fallen, 
while the time taken to exit has 
lengthened
The number of exits, either through public 
flotation or acquisition, has been decreasing 
each year since the peak in 2006 with 215 exits 
(Figure 6). This has dropped even further in the 
current recession, with only 74 exits in 2009. 
This is in line with the trends also identified 
in the US venture capital market.13 The fall 
precedes the financial crisis, so it is likely to 
partly reflect the decline in investments after 
the dotcom crash. 
The time it takes for a company to go from 
initial investment to IPO exit has lengthened 
around the world since 2000. At the peak of 
the Asian crisis in 1997 the average time to 
exit through flotation reaching close to seven 
years and then it dropped to three years during 
the dotcom boom before increasing once 
again to five to six years in the dotcom crash 
period (Figure 6).14 But the time to exit has 
lengthened even further in the latest crisis with 
the average time hitting an historic high of 7.4 
years in 2009. The median time to exit (which 
is less affected by extreme values) has been 
less volatile but suggests a bigger increase in 
the time to exit between the 1990s and the 
current financial crisis (Figure 7). 
Data for UK-based exits through acquisitions 
is only available after 2000. Analysis of these 
data confirms the phenomenon of lengthening 
times to exit through flotation and acquisitions 
(Figure 8).
12
10. Mason, C. and Pierrakis, 
Y. (2009) ‘Venture Capital, 
the regions and public 
policy.’ Hunter Centre for 
Entrepreneurship Working 
Paper 09-02.  Glasgow: 
Strathclyde University. 
11. Ibid.
12. See Table 2 in appendices. 
13. NVCA/PwC (2008) ‘The 
exit slowdown and the 
new venture capital 
landscape.’ Arlington, 
VA: National Venture 
Capital Association and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.
14. Investment activity 
before 2000 is not as well 
documented as for more 
recent times. The analysis 
presented for this period 
focuses mainly on IPOs. Data 
before 2000 for UK-based 
companies are somehow 
patchy. Although years to 
exit through an IPO may 
be slightly different from 
the years to exit through an 
acquisition, it provides some 
evidence of the time that 
a company needed to exit 
before 2000. 
Figure 5: Early-stage venture capital deals by source, 2000-2009
Source: for the years 2000-2008 Library House and for 2009 VentureSource Dow Jones, Thomson One and desk research 
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Figure 6: Number of exited companies, UK, 2000-2009 
Figure 7: Average time (in years) to exit through IPOs, 1990-2009, all countries 
Source: VentureSource Dow Jones
Source: Thomson One
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15. See Table 11 in appendices. 
UK-based companies that exited in 2008 and 
those in 2009 needed over three more years 
to exit on average than companies that exited 
in 2000.15 The sample average life cycle from 
initial invest to exit was 5.7 years; in 2008 it 
was over 6.2 years, the highest level of the 
decade. Time to exit is growing but this is 
part of a longer trend in the venture capital 
industry. The dotcom crisis had a severe impact 
on the length of time needed to gain a return, 
with an annual increase of 27 per cent in the 
time to exit in 2002 and 2003. In contrast, the 
change was only 8 per cent in 2008. However 
in absolute terms, the change was seven to 
nine months in 2002 and 2003 and five months 
in 2008 as the time to exit was already high. 
There is more uncertainty on how long 
it will take to exit an investment
Further analysis reveals that it is not only the 
time to exit that has increased throughout the 
decade, but there is also greater uncertainty on 
the expected time to exit. Between 2000 and 
2003 there was little dispersion on the time to 
exit for different investments, with all values 
concentrated around the median (the blue 
boxes in Figure 9, which length indicates that 
the difference between the percentiles 25 and 
75 of the distribution were narrow). This is not 
true anymore. In recent years, particularly since 
2007, there is a greater uncertainty about the 
time it would take to realise a return (the blue 
boxes in Figure 9 were higher). 
Overall this suggests that it now takes longer 
for investors to realise a return and there is 
less certainty about how long it will take them 
to do so. This will affect strategy planning for 
venture capital funds.
Companies require more rounds of 
funding before reaching the exit stage 
During the dotcom crash years (2001-2003), 
companies raised on average around £10 
million in approximately three funding rounds 
before flotation or acquisition (Figure 10). 
Since 2007, the total amounts have been 
decreasing while the number of funding rounds 
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Figure 8: Average time (in years) from initial investment to exit through IPOs and M&A, 
2000-2009, UK
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Figure 9: Years to exit, median and dispersion 
Figure 10: Average total amounts raised by companies and number of funding rounds 
before exit, 2000-2009 
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received before exit have started to edge up. In 
2009, exited companies raised on average £8 
million in four funding rounds. 
But firms that were successful at 
exiting during the recession generated 
favourable returns for their investors
An encouraging picture emerges when returns 
that funds make from their investments 
are considered.16 Following a dip after the 
dotcom crisis, return multiples have recovered 
(Figure 11). This trend – which is statistically 
significant17 – has not been impacted strongly 
by the recent financial crisis which suggests 
that returns have been fairly stable for those 
companies which have managed to exit over 
this time. This suggests that during the dotcom 
crisis companies were of lower quality and 
subsequently achieved lower returns, while 
instead the quality of the companies being 
exited in the financial crisis has not been 
affected. 
During the last decade 54 per cent of the UK 
exits recovered between one and five times 
the amount invested, while 10 per cent of exits 
returned five to ten times their invested capital. 
There were approximately 9 per cent homeruns, 
investments in which the venture capital funds 
made more than ten times what they had put 
in. In contrast, 27 per cent of the exits returned 
less capital than was initially invested.18 
In the last two years there has been a fall in 
the number of exits, but those that have exited 
have seen stable multiples. This is in contrast 
with the years that followed the dotcom crash, 
when the main issue appears to have been the 
quality of the underlying portfolio. This trend is 
supported by examining IRR data (Table 1). 
16
16. Information regarding cash 
in-to-valuation multiples 
and gross internal rates 
of return (IRR) is scarce. 
Thus, a limitation of this 
analysis is that we only 
consider the small number 
of exited companies with 
all transaction details and 
post-valuations disclosed, 
especially for the years 2008 
and 2009.
17. See Table 3, Panel B, 
columns (v) and (vi).
18. See Figure 23 in appendices.
Figure 11: Median cash in-to-valuation multiples for UK exited companies by sector, 2000-
2009
* There was no sufficient number of ICT exits in our sample for the year 2006 and 2008
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Multiples
Consumer and Business Healthcare and Medical ICT Total
17
Table 1 provides an overview of the investment 
return expressed as Gross Internal Rate 
of Return (IRR) by exited companies per 
percentile and per year. Note that this is not 
the fund level performance IRR but simply 
the IRR by exited companies. There are big 
variations in the company returns. Since 2002, 
the top 25 percent of companies experienced 
returns of between 50 per cent and 78 per 
cent while the median size of returns has been 
between 17 per cent and 34 per cent.
Table 1: Gross IRR by percentile, 2000-2009
  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
N Valid 45 25 21 21 48 51 25 29 15 14
Percentiles 10 115% -45% -68% 0% -8% -14% -1% 0% -7% 0%
 25 173% 0% -2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0%
 50 (median) 429% 44% 0% 17% 26% 29% 34% 19% 25% 18%
 75 7,177% 1,977% 59% 78% 68% 58% 72% 53% 50% 67%
The returns are annualised 
Figure 12: Multiples by year, 2000-09
Note: The numbers in the columns represent the numbers of exits included
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Part 3: Investment activity within individual sectors
Individual sectors have their own 
characteristics, and this is also true when 
it comes to venture capital financing for 
companies in different industries. Our analysis 
of venture capital activity in 2009 within 
sectors highlights that ICT still dominates 
venture capital investments and energy 
investments received higher levels of funding. 
Healthcare companies that exited between 
2000-2009, received on average £3 million 
more funds per funding round and needed nine 
months more to exit compared with companies 
operating in the Consumer and Business 
sector.19
ICT continues to dominate venture 
capital investments
In 2009, ICT continued to attract the largest 
proportion of investments followed by 
Consumer and Businesses and Healthcare 
and Medical industries with 26 per cent and 
18
19. See Table 2 and Table 3 in 
appendices. 
Figure 13: Investments by industry 
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Figure 16: Median amount of investment by source of finance and industry, 2009
Figure 15: Investments by industry and by round, 2009
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22 per cent respectively (Figure 13). Energy 
and others received 12 per cent.20 Energy 
investments required significantly larger deal 
sizes, twice the level of all the other sectors 
considered. 
Consumer and Business companies received 
fewer later-stage rounds compared with other 
sectors while Healthcare and Medical received 
the most in proportional terms (Figure 15). 
Around 76 per cent of all investments in the 
Consumer and Business sector were in first or 
second round deals, 70 per cent in Energy and 
Environment, 67 per cent in ICT and only 60 
per cent in Medical and Healthcare.
Both business angel and public funds are active 
in all sectors, though their contributions to 
each sector varies (Figure 16). 
Variations in time to exit between 
sectors exist, but are not large 
Examining exits by sector as a proportion 
of overall exits suggests that there have 
been more exits in Healthcare and Medical 
companies in recent years, reflecting the 
increasing investments trend in Healthcare and 
Medical companies (Figure 17). In contrast, 
exits in Consumer and Businesses have been 
gradually decreasing as a proportion of all 
exits. 
Examining time to exits for the different sectors 
highlights some differences. For example, 
venture capital funds take nine months 
longer longer to exit from Health and Medical 
companies compared with Consumer and 
Businesses companies (see Figure 18 Table 3 
and Table 5 in appendices). 
20. For industry description see 
Table 6 in appendices.
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Figure 17: Proportion of exits by industry 
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Figure 18: Average time (in years) from initial investment to exit through IPOs and M&A 
by industry, 2000-2009, UK
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Part 4: Fundraising activity over the last decade
Examining fundraising activity gives an insight 
into market confidence and the prospects for 
a recovery in investment activity. Previous 
research published by NESTA highlighted 
that the situation in the UK was beginning 
to become quite constrained. Only 39 funds 
actively invested in the early-stage space over 
the last five years, and the current set of funds 
were largely tapped out.21 
The picture emerging from 2009 does not 
suggest that growth will return quickly to 
the UK venture capital market. The trend of 
declining fundraising seen since the dotcom 
crash continues with both the number of new 
funds and total invested seeing drops of over 
50 per cent in the last year. Public funding 
remains an important contributor towards 
fundraising. Without this funding, the early-
stage market would be in a particularly perilous 
state. 
Venture capital fundraising has been 
acutely hit by the recent crisis
Long-term issues may be developing as 
fundraising continues to be weak (Figure 19 
and Figure 20). The decrease in fundraising 
activity that the market experienced in 2009 
is significant. Only 11 funds (nine new and 
two existing) were able to raise capital in 2009 
compared with 22 (20 new and two existing) 
in 2008 (a 50 per cent drop) raising a total of 
£573.6 million, down from £1,613 million in 
2008 (a drop of 64 per cent). 
The number of funds closed fell from 106 
funds worth £6,409 million in 2000 to 37 funds 
raising £919.5 million in 2002, representing 
a decrease of 65 per cent for the number of 
funds and 86 per cent on the amounts raised. 
However these falls were from a far higher level 
of fundraising than that seen in the recent 
crisis. 
Early-stage funds have also been severely 
affected, falling from eight funds in 2008 
to four funds in 2009 raising £128 million 
in 2009 compared to £329 million the year 
before (a drop of 50 per cent and 61 per cent 
respectively). 
The lack of distributions that limited 
partnerships have received from existing 
investments (and other allocations issues 
arising from the market turmoil) means that 
they have less capital available to commit 
to new funds; and although the majority 
of investors will be active in 2010, they are 
anticipated to invest less than in recent years.22 
22
21. NESTA (2009) ‘Reshaping 
the UK Economy.’ London: 
NESTA.
22. AltAssets, 13 Jan Newsletter.
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Figure 19: Number of funds raising capital by stage, 2000-2009
Figure 20: Amounts raised by stage, 2000-2009
Source: Thomson One
Source: Thomson One
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Part 5: Conclusions
The current financial crisis, while it originated 
outside the industry, has been particularly 
hard felt by the venture capital industry. More 
pessimistic prospects for their venture capital-
backed companies, less welcoming exit markets 
and a tight funding environment have all 
contributed to the retrenchment of all elements 
of the industry in 2009. Amounts invested fell 
by around 27 per cent over the past year, the 
number of exits either through public flotation 
or acquisition has dropped by 40 per cent and 
fundraising fell by over 50 per cent (both in 
terms of the number of new funds and total 
invested). 
The dotcom crisis had a different origin, 
triggered as it was by over-exuberant 
assumptions on the speed of internet 
development, but also deeply impacted the 
venture capital industry. Examining the two 
crises shows some similarities – in the dotcom 
crisis, as in the financial crisis, there was a 
significant reduction in investments after the 
crisis. The venture capital market suffered 
contractions for two years in a row, with early-
stage investments the first to be cut back, in 
both recessions. 
But there are important differences.
•	Fundraising in 2009 is the lowest in the 
past decade. Both the dotcom and financial 
crises resulted in a significant reduction in 
the number of new venture capital funds 
established. However current fundraising 
activity is considerably lower than levels seen 
after the dotcom crash and consequently the 
lowest levels seen in the last decade. 
•	The situation now would be far worse 
without public funding. Public funds hardly 
featured in dotcom era venture capital. Now 
they participate in around 40 per cent of all 
venture capital deals. Public policy matters in 
this area. 
•	It is taking longer for investors to see 
returns on their investment. Across the 
world, the time taken to successfully exit 
through flotation now averages almost seven 
and a half years, the longest time seen over 
the past two decades. This global trend is 
reflected in the UK market. This obviously 
has knock-on impacts on a fund’s ability to 
invest in new companies.
•	Even with all this gloom, the 
fundamentals of the UK venture capital 
market appear sound. Funds are still 
capable of exiting good companies, with 
returns much stronger than they were 
immediately after the dotcom. Even if funds 
had hoped for better returns from these 
companies, their exits allow track records to 
be developed which will enable new funds to 
be raised. Additionally venture capital funds 
are delivering companies to exit with lower 
total capital invested than in previous years. 
 
When is a recovery likely?
Following the dotcom crisis, the venture capital 
industry underwent two years of contraction 
before recovering. This pattern was seen both 
in terms of investment activity and fundraising. 
The current recession has now seen two 
years of contraction. However, there is little 
evidence to suggest that activity will increase 
significantly during 2010, especially for seed 
and early-stage companies. The key differences 
between the current and last venture capital 
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crisis highlight why a recovery appears unlikely 
in the next few months. 
•	First, fundraising activity is very low and 
venture capital funds are already largely 
tapped out. Fundraising recovery precedes 
investments, as seen with the increase in 
early-stage fundraising in 2003, which led 
to higher investments activity in 2004. The 
continued downturn of fundraising in 2009 
does not bode well for a near-term recovery.
•	Second, it is taking longer than ever for 
investors to realise returns. Leading venture 
capital funds are concentrating on their 
existing portfolios, rather than searching for 
new business opportunities. Low levels of 
stock market activity coupled with decreasing 
numbers of mergers and acquisitions suggest 
that UK venture capital-backed companies 
face continuing difficulties in identifying 
ways of exiting. Without clear exit routes, 
funds will continue to preserve their existing 
portfolio. 
The launch of the UK Innovation Investment 
Fund earlier this year should bolster the 
venture capital industry. As funding kicks in, 
investments are anticipated to be made over 
the course of the year. The impact of public 
funds, and a gradual recovery of the UK 
economy, may result in the venture capital 
market beginning to recover towards the end 
of the year and a mild upturn in investments 
activity in 2011. 
The key to the recovery of the industry will be 
driven by economic financial stability resulting 
in a more active M&A market and greater 
confidence of investors allocating a percentage 
of their portfolios towards venture capital. 
The ‘recovery years’ between 2004 and 2007 
following the dotcom crash saw an increase in 
new investments that should be ripening for 
exit over the next few years. This will give the 
best performing venture capital funds the track 
record they need to raise new funds.
Appendix 1: Methodology and data analysis
The study draws information on investments 
from commercially available databases.  
Though no commercial database provides 
total population coverage of venture capital 
investments made to UK companies, the 
study assumes these databases provide a 
representative sample of the population.  
For the purpose of this study, VentureSource 
Dow Jones, Thomson One Private Equity 
and Library House (now absorbed into 
VentureSource Dow Jones) are the main 
sources of data. These databases provide 
disaggregated data on investments and 
enable analysis of particular characteristics of 
deals, such as name of company that received 
finance, stage and source of finance and 
industry focus. 
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Appendix 2: Variables
Venture capital investments 
Data on investments activity, number of 
deals and amounts invested, are presented 
by funding rounds (seed rounds, first and 
second rounds and later-stage rounds) and by 
year.23 Aggregated data have been obtained by 
VentureSource Dow Jones. 
Fundraising activity is assessed by the total 
number of funds and amounts raised by 
venture capital firms in a given year. The 
Thomson One database has been used 
to collect aggregated data by stage of 
development. Data are reported in five stages: 
seed, early-stage, expansion, development and 
later-stage.24
Publicly backed investments 
For the years 2000 to 2008, figures of public 
investments were obtained from previously 
published NESTA reports.25 For 2009, two 
commercial databases, VentureSource and 
Thomson One, have been merged for the 
purpose of this analysis. Desk research, 
supported by interviews, was used to identify 
all venture capital funds that received public 
money have been identified.26
The type of investment has been separated 
into two categories: 
•	Those involving one or more private sector 
investors. This category primarily captures 
venture capital firms. It also identifies 
investments made by some types of Business 
Angels, specifically investor networks (e.g. 
angel syndicates), family offices and named 
and un-named high net worth individuals. 
Because of their size, these investments 
are much more visible than those of typical 
Business Angels. However, a key limitation 
of the data is that investments by Business 
Angels are only identified where they have 
co-invested with either private or public 
sector funds. Investments made by individual 
angel investors or syndicates by themselves 
will not be captured here. 
•	Those involving one or more publicly backed 
funds (e.g. Regional Venture Capital Funds, 
University Challenge Funds, Enterprise 
Capital Funds). These are funds that have 
received some or all of their capital from the 
public sector, including central government 
departments, regional development agencies 
and the European Union (e.g. European 
Regional Development Fund). They are 
normally managed by independent fund 
managers. 
Venture capital investments have been 
also partitioned into early-stage; equal to 
investments made for amounts equal or less 
than £2 million, in founding rounds 1, 2 or 3. 
The £2 million cap has been used as it has been 
identified by government as the main area of 
market failure.27
Industry categorisation 
The two databases (VentureSource and 
Thomson One) provide industry classifications 
which do not entirely match, and are narrow. 
To overcome this issue, four new industry 
categories have been created and all sub-
sectors were grouped under these new 
categories (Consumer and Businesses, ICT, 
Medical and Healthcare and Energy and 
27
23. VentureSource classifies 
equity rounds as follows. 
Seed rounds: are initial 
rounds invested in 
companies at very early 
stages of development, 
typically with the founders 
and product developers such 
as engineers or molecular 
biologists on board, 
but without a complete 
management team in place. 
First Round, Second Round: 
this ordinal nomenclature 
is used to describe most 
venture rounds. Companies 
often refer to financing 
rounds as ‘first’, ‘second’, 
‘third’ etc. even though the 
legal term for the transaction 
as stated in closing 
documents and amendments 
to the documents of 
incorporation may refer to 
them as series A preferred, 
series B common, etc. 
Later Stage: 3rd, 4th, 5th, 
6th, 7th, 8th, 9th. Later: 
VentureSource classifies all 
equity rounds subsequent 
to the second round as later 
rounds.
24. Thomson One provides the 
following classification. 
Early Stage: this stage 
describes funds that make 
investments into portfolio 
companies after the Seed 
Stage/Start-up for product 
development, initial 
marketing, manufacturing 
and sales activities. Seed 
Stage: this stage describes 
funds that make investments 
in newly formed companies 
thereby helping a company’s 
founders to develop and 
design a product or service. 
Expansion: expansion stage 
funds invest into portfolio 
companies that have 
products and services that 
are currently available, and 
require additional capital 
to expand production 
to increase revenue. 
Development:  this stage 
describes funds that are 
managed by firms that 
belong to the business 
development group. 
Business development 
funds make investments 
into portfolio companies 
whose primary objective 
is to increase investments, 
employment, and revenue 
to a regional geographic 
area. Later Stage: this stage 
describes funds that make 
investments into portfolio 
companies that have an 
already established product 
or service that has already 
generated revenue, but 
may not be making a profit. 
Later stage funds make the 
last round of investments in 
portfolio companies before 
an exit in the form of an IPO 
or acquisition by a strategic 
partner.
25. NESTA (2008) ‘Shifting 
Sands.’ London: NESTA; 
and NESTA (2008) ‘Venture 
capital fundraising activity. 
London: NESTA.
26. This includes funds that are 
100 per cent publicly backed 
e.g. NESTA and those that 
receive finance through a 
government scheme such as 
RVCFs, ECFs etc. 
27. Almeida Capital (2005) ‘A 
Mapping Study of Venture 
Capital Provision to SMEs 
in England and Wales.’ 
Sheffield: Small Business 
Service.
Other). For a detailed analysis of the industries 
by sub-sector, see Table 6 in appendices.
Exits 
Exits are defined as mergers, acquisitions, 
asset acquisitions and IPOs. The VentureSource 
Dow Jones database has been used to 
conduct this analysis. In the study sample, 
acquisitions are the dominant exit path.28 To 
calculate the time to exit, only companies 
that had information for all their transaction 
dates from first investment to exit have been 
included. Therefore, exited companies with 
missing transaction date information have 
been excluded from the study sample. In 
several cases information provided only for the 
date of the exit and no previous transaction 
information were available. The study sample 
contains over 3,000 investment transactions for 
approximately 800 venture-backed firms that 
were exited between 2000 and 2009. 
Time to exit
The ‘time to exit’ for each company that exited 
with all information of transactions disclosed 
has been calculated as the duration (in years) 
from the date of the first investment to this 
company (seed round, individual investment, 
first venture capital investment) until the date 
of its first acquisition, asset acquisition, IPO or 
merger. It is worth noting that Thomson One 
captures only a limited number of investments 
made by individuals and therefore the most 
likely form of first investment in the database 
is first round venture capital investment.29 
Therefore, the figures reported here may not 
be necessarily representative when the very 
first investment comes from a Business Angel. 
Returns 
Beyond the dates of the funding rounds, the 
identity of the investors, type of investment 
and type of exit, VentureSource Dow Jones 
often provides post-valuation information. For 
exited companies with detailed information 
for all amounts raised prior to exit and post-
valuations, two performance indicators have 
been constructed. 
As a substitute to the return multiples, 
an indicative value has been used. This is 
expressed as the ratio of the total cash inflows 
to the post-valuation for each exited company. 
When calculating return multiples, IPOs 
have been treated as exits and the amounts 
raised through an IPO are not included. The 
International Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Valuation Guidelines30 for calculating return 
multiples have not been adhered to where 
there is insufficient information. However these 
ratios can be used as an indication of venture 
capital performance investments over time.
In order to control for the effect of time on 
financial returns, the gross internal rate of 
returns (IRRs), which provides the return for a 
schedule of cash flows that is not necessarily 
periodic, has been calculated as follows: all 
cash flows that corresponded to a schedule of 
payments in dates have been captured. The 
first payment corresponds to a cost or payment 
that occurs at the beginning of the investment 
and all succeeding payments are discounted 
based on a 365-day year. 
The total funds that a company raises before 
exit have also been measured. Total amount 
raised is the sum of all invested amounts to 
a given company. IPOs are treated as exits 
and therefore amounts raised through an IPO 
are excluded. Individual invested amounts, 
complete transaction details and post-valuation 
data were obtained from VentureSource Dow 
Jones. 
28
28. See Table 7 in appendices. 
29. Initial investment from an 
individual represented only 
8 per cent of the exited 
companies in our sample.
30. The Guidelines were 
developed by the 
Association Française des 
Investisseurs en Capital 
(AFIC), the British Venture 
Capital Association (BVCA) 
and the European Private 
Equity and Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA) and were 
launched in March 2005. 
29
Appendix 3: Regression analysis
Regression analysis has been conducted in 
order to explore whether the relationships 
uncovered by visually examining the data 
were statistically significant as well as not 
just driven by other factors not captured by 
the graphs. Several regression models have 
been estimated to analyse the impact of 
the financial crisis on the VC industry while 
accounting for characteristics of the investment 
deal, the VC source and the industry. Using 
regression analysis, the effect of the financial 
crisis on the average amount of funds raised 
in each funding round, the time to exit and 
the financial return on investment have been 
measured. 
The size of individual deal per round has 
been compared on a set of dummies for the 
source of finance, time since last investment, 
round number, industry dummies and year of 
investment (Panel A). At the company level, 
the impact of the same variables to the time 
that a company needs to exit has also been 
examined (Panel B). Financial return indicators 
(cash in-to-valuation multiples and gross 
IRR) have been regressed on variables such 
as the number of rounds and the time to exit, 
controlling for a set of dummies for different 
years of investment (first and last investment 
(Panel B)). All regressions include control 
dummies for different sources of finance 
(public, private or Business Angel investment) 
and industries (Energy and Other, Medical 
and Health, ICT and Consumer and Business). 
Private investments, Consumer and Business 
industry, year 1995 for Panels A and year 
1987 and 2000 for Panel B are the omitted 
categories. Quantile regressions have also been 
examined since there are outliers that may 
influence the results of the OLS model. 
Panel A shows regression coefficients for the 
amount of funds raised by an exited company 
per funding round. Investments with Business 
Angel or publicly backed fund involvement 
were approximately two and a half million 
pounds smaller in size than those made 
solely by private funds (coeff: -2.473*** and 
-2.786***). Industry variables coefficients 
suggest that Healthcare and Medical exited 
companies received larger deals (by three 
million pounds) compared with companies 
operating in the Consumer and Businesses 
sector (coeff: 3.035*** ). Investments made 
in 2000 were significantly larger and their size 
dropped in 2002. Column (ii) shows results 
from a quantile regression and the coefficients 
are very similar but smaller. Regression 
coefficients for the natural log of the amount 
of funds raised by an exited company per 
funding round although not reported here, 
show similar results.
Columns (i) and (ii) in Panel B examine the 
effect of the source of finance (public, private 
or Business Angel) on the time that a company 
needs to exit. Companies that at any point in 
time received investment by a Business Angel 
or a publicly backed fund do not differentiate 
from companies that received finance from 
solely private VC in terms of time to exit. In 
addition, the total amount of money that a 
company raises before exit does not seem to 
affect the time to exit (coeff: .005). Column 
(ii) shows results from a quantile regression 
and, again, the relevant coefficients are 
slightly larger but do not significantly change. 
Industries coefficients suggest that companies 
operating in the Healthcare and Medical sector 
need more time to exit (nine months) than 
companies from the Consumer and Business 
sector.
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Table 2: Panel A: Deal level analysis 
  
  (i) OLS (ii) Quantile
 Deal size (£m) Deal size (£m)
Business Angel involvement  -2.473*** -1.060***
 (-2.66) (-4.76)
Public fund involvement  -2.786*** -1.504***
 (-3.73) (-4.34)
Time since last investment 0.091 0.142***
 (1.25) (6.73)
Round number 1.994*** 0.428***
 (3.77) (7.37)
Industry dummies  
Energy & Other -1.672 1.017**
 (-0.73) (2.05)
Healthcare & Medical 3.035*** 2.218***
 (3.03) (7.71)
ICT 1.454 0.737***
 (1.44) (3.21)
Year of investment   
1996 2.922 2.795
 (0.72) (1.37)
1997 -0.383 1.759
 (-0.20) (0.95)
1998 -1.094 1.450
 (-0.51) (0.86)
1999 2.646 3.434**
 (1.52) (2.10)
2000 9.574*** 5.069***
 (4.15) (3.15)
2001 2.265 3.272**
 (1.09) (2.03)
2002 -0.011 1.670
 (-0.01) (1.04)
2003 -0.447 1.926
 (-0.21) (1.19)
2004 -0.050 1.630
 (-0.02) (1.01)
2005 -1.356 1.812
 (-0.57) (1.11)
2006 -1.190 1.843
 (-0.47) (1.12)
2007 -4.160 1.885
 (-1.47) (1.10)
2008 -0.717 1.254
 (-0.23) (0.68)
Constant -3.005*** -1.859
 (-1.21) (-1.15)
Observations 1239 1239
R-squared 0.13  
  
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per 
cent, Consumer and Business is used as the reference industry. Year 1995 has been omitted. 
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Table 3: Panel B: Company level analysis
  
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
  Time to exit Time to exit Multiples IRR (log)  Multiples IRR (log) 
  (quantile) (log)  (log)
Business Angel involvement  0.105 0.130 0.115 0.161 -0.067 0.083
 (0.55) (0.56) (0.66) (1.17) (-0.42) (0.69)
Public fund involvement  0.362 0.529 -0.058 -0.011 0.085 0.050
 (1.52) (1.61) (-0.23) (-0.06) (0.36) (0.27)
Number of rounds 0.520*** 0.623*** -0.175*** -0.070 -0.208*** -0.082*
 (8.65) (9.12) (-3.65) (-1.37) (-4.72) (-1.91)
Time to exit   -0.088** -0.023 -0.035 -0.027
   (-2.31) (-0.84) (0.76) (-1.00)
Total amount raised before exit 0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003*
 (1.62) (1.27) (-1.15) (-1.66) (1.52) (-1.83)
Industry dummies    
Energy and other 0.246 0.531 0.470 0.003 0.748** 0.058
 (0.47) (0.86) (1.38) (0.01) (2.56) (0.20)
Healthcare and Medical  0.379 0.856** 0.134 -0.058 -0.100 -0.118
 (1.34) (2.39) (0.53) (-0.30) (-0.44) (-0.65)
ICT 0.029 0.563** 0.179 -0.022 -0.015 -0.156
 (0.14) (2.17) (0.83) (-0.15) (-0.07) (-1.16)
Year of first investment     
1988 6.313*** 13.682*** 1.445*** 0.211
 (8.08) (9.26) (6.54) (-1.26)
1990 7.576*** 15.244***  
 (39.77) (22.13)  
1991 0.000 7.643*** -0.419 -0.960***
 (.) (10.72) (-1.23) (-3.73)
1992 -0.822 8.370*** -0.179 0.225
 (-0.81) (5.72) (-0.42) (0.58)
1993 -0.884 5.086*** -1.573 -0.019
 (-0.65) (3.40) (-1.20) (-0.02)
1994 -1.408 6.443*** -1.136* 0.908*
 (-1.04) (5.43) (-1.75) (1.76)
1995 -3.946*** 4.022*** -0.673 0.187
 (-3.82) (3.80) (-0.84) (0.40)
1996 -2.794*** 4.564*** -1.667** -0.129
 (-3.43) (4.68) (-2.49) (-0.24)
1997 -3.758*** 3.762*** -1.769*** -0.127
 (-7.90) (4.53) (-3.27) (-0.31)
1998 -4.398*** 3.366*** -1.779*** -0.442
 (-13.84) (4.58) (-3.40) (-1.04)
1999 -4.749*** 3.196*** -1.677*** -0.135
 (-16.48) (4.57) (-3.05) (-0.33)
2000 -5.221*** 2.486*** -2.088*** -0.539
 (-25.05) (3.57) (-3.96) (-1.32)
2001 -4.866*** 2.927*** -1.587*** -0.030
 (-18.81) (4.05) (-2.93) (-0.07)
2002 -5.225*** 2.539*** -1.218** 0.151
 (-14.75) (3.50) (-1.97) (-0.37)
2003 -5.967*** 1.628** -1.706*** -0.440
 (-17.78) (2.10) (-2.70) (-0.89)
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  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
  Time to exit Time to exit Multiples IRR (log)  Multiples IRR (log) 
  (quantile) (log)  (log)
2004 -5.872*** 1.855** -1.411** 0.138
 (-17.45) (2.37) (-2.47) (0.31)
2005 -6.065*** 2.108** -0.128 0.129
 (-22.55) (1.97) (-0.20) (0.28)
2006 -5.837*** 1.929* -2.309*** -0.194
 (-24.94) (1.93) (-3.38) (-0.31)
2007 -6.642*** 1.533* -1.454 -0.268
 (-20.42) (1.66) (-1.60) (-0.30)
2008 -7.955***   
 (-14.35)     
Year of exit    
2001     -0.861** -0.808***
     (-2.03) (-3.24)
2002     -1.782*** -0.885***
     (-6.28) (-4.08)
2003     -1.237*** -0.419*
     (-3.94) (-1.93)
2004     -0.781*** -0.273
     (-3.01) (-1.36)
2005     -0.675*** -0.290
     (-2.71) (-1.38)
2006     -0.650* -0.034
     (-1.85) (-0.16)
2007     -0.522 -0.174
     (-1.62) (-0.87)
2008     -0.170 -0.011
     (-0.41) (-0.04)
2009     -0.422 -0.104
     (-0.99) (-0.37)
Constant 7.050*** -1.564** 3.290*** 4.920*** 2.357*** 5.124***
  (23.36) (-2.32) (5.47) (11.21) (10.78) (30.12)
Observations 574 574 289 283 289 283
R-squared 0.44   0.20 0.13 0.22 0.13
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 1 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 10 per 
cent, Consumer and Business is used as the reference industry. Year 1987 has been omitted for columns 1 to 4. Year 2000 has 
been omitted for columns 5 and 6. 
The rest of Panel B shows regression 
coefficients for the natural log of the price 
to cash multiples and the gross IRR. Columns 
(iii) and (iv) control for the year of the first 
investment made to exited companies while 
columns (v) and (vi) control for the year that 
the company exited. The results suggest that 
the number of rounds, controlling for the 
overall time to exit, is negatively related to the 
multiple returns and one extra round of finance 
reduces the multiple returns by approximately 
20 per cent. However, the number of rounds 
has only a small impact on the IRR returns. 
The time to exit can be associated with 
negative returns. One extra year in the lifecycle 
of the company reduces the multiples by 
approximately 9 per cent but its impact on IRR 
is not significant. The size of the total amounts 
raised by the company before exit does not 
significantly affect financial returns. 
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Examination of the impact of the two crises 
on the returns unveils a significant decrease 
(approximately 1.8x in terms of multiples 
and 89 per cent in terms of IRR) of returns 
during the dotcom crisis (2002) but shows 
no evidence of such decrease during the 
current financial crisis. This suggests that 
during the dotcom crisis there was a realisation 
that companies were of low quality, which 
brought the returns down, while instead the 
quality of the companies being exited in the 
financial crisis has not been affected. Quantile 
regressions do not show significant differences 
in the results and therefore are not reported 
here.
Further analysis particularly concerned with 
the effect of company characteristics such as 
quality and age of business in different years, 
would contribute to the robustness of this 
analysis.
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Appendix 4: Tables and figures
Table 4: Early-stage investments by year and type of investor, 2000-2009
  
Year  Deals made by private  Publicly backed  Total Publicly backed 
 and other funds investments   investments as a 
    percentage of all  
    early-stage deals
2000 105 27 132 20%
2001 110 61 171 36%
2002 94 74 168 44%
2003 122 127 249 51%
2004 143 172 315 55%
2005 122 211 333 63%
2006 118 170 288 59%
2007 114 176 290 61%
2008 67 141 208 68%
2009 68 86 154 56%
Source: For the years 2000-2008 Library House and for 2009 VentureSource Dow Jones, Thomson One and desk research31 
Note: Financing Completion Date: No Earlier Than:01-Jan-00 No Later Than:31-Dec-09; Financing Round Class: Acquisition, Merger, Public Investment, Buyout; 
Business Status: Private or Independent, Publicly Held, Out of Business, Acquired or Merged, In IPO Registration, In Bankruptcy.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics – Time to exit (only exited companies with all available transaction data)
     Std.    Std.   Std.   Std.   Std. 
Year N Mean  Deviation N Mean  Deviation N Mean Deviation N Mean Deviation N Mean Deviation
2000 77 2.605 2.368 20 1.636 1.363 1 5.504 . 9 3.635 3.291 43 2.934 2.438
2001 64 2.316 2.463 35 2.049 2.458 2 7.225 6.885 7 2.940 2.312 20 2.073 1.498
2002 71 2.951 2.078 28 2.315 0.851 3 1.711 1.346 6 4.949 4.233 32 2.898 1.563
2003 65 3.735 2.389 17 3.697 1.721 1 3.118 . 5 3.513 2.601 41 3.827 2.683
2004 104 4.409 2.168 28 4.117 1.866 3 2.247 0.477 22 4.102 2.325 50 4.894 2.203
2005 121 4.903 2.300 26 4.382 2.435 8 4.704 2.740 25 4.594 2.324 60 5.317 2.158
2006 108 5.769 2.263 37 6.057 1.888 4 5.497 1.759 14 5.712 2.537 51 5.616 2.470
2007 71 5.715 2.879 27 5.443 2.671 3 3.825 1.603 14 5.007 2.362 27 6.565 3.267
2008 74 6.188 3.054 18 5.342 3.297 7 5.638 4.365 12 6.929 1.978 35 6.727 2.811
2009 60 5.696 2.884 14 6.189 3.075 4 3.518 2.429 14 5.831 2.853 26 5.809 2.898
Total  815 4.517 2.777 250 4.060 2.698 36 4.432 3.048 129 4.922 2.729 385 4.756 2.782
31. This source was also used by 
NESTA (2008) and Mason 
and Pierrakis (2009). Some 
of the figures reported 
here may differ slightly 
from those cited by NESTA 
(2008): (i) the Library House 
database is live and so is 
continually being updated; 
(ii) further cleaning of 
the data by the authors. 
However, these changes do 
not change the observed 
trends and the argument 
made by NESTA (2008).
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Table 6: Industry categorisation 
  
Industry Industry  
Group
Consumer and Business Services (Not Financial)
Businesses
 Cons/Bus Products
  Cons/Bus Services
  Consumer & Business  
 Services: Other
  Consumer Services
  Education & Training Services
  Financial Institutions & Services
  Media, Content & Information
  Restaurants & Food Service
  Retailers
  Retailing & Mass Merchandising
  Specialty Retailers
  Transportation Services
Energy and Adv Spec Mat & Chem
Other
 Agriculture
  Coal
  Energy
Healthcare  Alternate Sites (Out-Patient)
and Medical
 Biopharmaceuticals
  Biotechnology Therapeutics
  Diagnostic Equipment (Not Imaging)
  Drug Development Technologies
  Healthcare Services
  Medical & Lab Services
  Medical Devices/Equipment
ICT Application-Specific Integrated  
 Circuit
  Broadcasting
 Business Applications Software
Industry Industry  
Group 
 ICT Communication & Networks
  Communications & Computers
  Computer Systems
  Connectivity & Communications  
 Software
  Connectivity Products
  Data Management Services
  Database Software
  Design Automation Software
  Electronic Components
  Electronics & Computers
  Fibreoptic Equipment & Photonics
  General Purpose Integrated Circuits
  IT Consultants
  Information Services
  Integrated Circuit Production
  Medical Software
  Multimedia Networking Software
  Network & Systems Management  
 Software
  Recreational & Home Software
  Semiconductors
  Software
  Software Development Tools
  Software: Other
 Tele/Videoconferencing Equipment  
 & Serv
 Telecommunications Service  
 Providers
 Vertical Market Applications  
 Software
 Wireless Communications Equipment
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Table 7: Exits by type, 2000-2009
  
Round Type  Freq.  Per cent Cum.
Acquisition 503 61.58 61.58
Asset Acquisition 43 5.3 66.87
Buyout – LBO 15 1.85 68.72
Gov’t Grant 1 0.12 68.84
Management Buy-In 4 0.49 69.33
Management Buyout 70 8.62 77.96
Merger 17 2.09 80.05
Public Invest. – PPPE 1 0.12 80.17
Public Invest. – 2PO 1 0.12 80.3
Public Invest. – IPO 150 18.47 98.77
Reverse Merger 10 1.23 100
Total 815 100  
Figure 21: Proportion of amounts invested by stage (£m), 2000-2009
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Figure 22: Proportion of number of deals by stage, 2000-2009
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Table 8: Fundraising activity 2000-2009
  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of funds                    
Seed 11 2 6 2 4 1 3 2  
Early Stage 50 17 14 10 6 10 11 5 8 4
Balanced Stage 30 16 10 3 8 12 21 15 10 6
Expansion 5 9 3 3 8 2 9 4 3 1
Development 4 3 2 2      
Later stage 6 3 2 3 3 1 4 1 1 0
Total  106 50 37 23 29 26 48 27 22 11
Size in GBP millions                  
Seed 348.7 45.9 57.9 8.7 15.7 6 16.6 51.3  
Early Stage 2609.6 705.5 310.2 499.1 334.2 264.1 813.1 240.6 329.3 128.2
Balanced Stage 2604.7 1322.2 265.6 534.2 582.7 978.3 2070.6 1978.6 915.5 400
Expansion 452.2 651.9 127.8 63.2 362.9 119.4 772.2 48.3 332.1 45.4
Development 54.3 20.5 106.8 300      
Later stage 339.7 554.4 51.2 66.2 47.2 37.7 174 38.7 36.5 0
Total  6409.2 3300.4 919.5 1471.4 1342.7 1405.5 3846.5 2357.5 1613.4 573.6
Source: Thomson One
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics – Total amounts raised and financing rounds for exited 
companies, 2000-09
  
 Rounds Total amounts raised (no IPOs)
   Std.    Std.  
Year N Mean Deviation N Mean Deviation
2000 75 3.56 2.158 59 11.726 15.6315
2001 64 2.80 1.115 43 8.277 19.1310
2002 71 3.24 1.399 56 9.350 18.1948
2003 65 3.31 1.310 54 9.013 14.3801
2004 104 3.98 1.911 89 12.117 24.5765
2005 121 4.05 1.966 96 12.862 20.3530
2006 108 3.94 1.631 74 17.942 42.9843
2007 71 4.35 2.192 49 14.117 19.2432
2008 74 3.96 2.030 53 13.685 47.3824
2009 60 3.90 1.980 36 8.082 9.6516
Table 10: Descriptive statistics – Cash in-to-valuation multiples 
  
Year N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean  Deviation
2000 48 0.358 32.182 268.308 5.58974 6.151991
2001 26 0.063 38.64 180.308 6.93491 10.38065
2002 23 0.094 7.253 40.259 1.75041 2.018292
2003 21 0.133 13.56 48.335 2.30168 3.077858
2004 52 0.016 30.08 167.344 3.21815 5.513188
2005 51 0.061 128.656 253.917 4.97876 17.85689
2006 25 0.019 50 136.085 5.44339 10.696
2007 30 0.016 28.068 131.018 4.36728 6.366624
2008 16 0.129 20.495 86.944 5.43399 6.210825
2009 12 0.565 17.365 64.759 5.39661 6.027179
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Table 11: Tests for differences in the means of years to exit for UK-based venture capital-
backed companies, 2000-2009
  
Year N Coef. Std. Err.
2001 64 -0.421 0.414
2002 71 0.09 0.393
2003 65 0.581 0.403
2004 104 1.651*** 0.365
2005 121 1.935*** 0.319
2006 108 3.010*** 0.356
2007 71 2.961*** 0.4
2008 74 3.580*** 0.387
2009 60 3.325*** 0.409
_cons   2.753 0.268
R sqr  0.22 
N   807  
Note: *** denotes values which are statistically different from those of 2000 at the 1 per cent level.
Table 11 reports summary statistics for the 
explanatory variables years to exit. It tests for 
differences in sample means between each year 
between 2001 and 2009 and 2000 in terms 
of the time that takes for a company to exit. 
The table includes all exited companies with 
transaction details. The number of observations 
is as recorded in the second column.
Table 12: Variable description
  
Variable name Description 
Business Angel involvement Dummy that takes the value 1 if one or more Business Angel participated in the  
 deal and 0 otherwise
Public fund involvement  Dummy that takes the value 1 if one or more Publicly backed funds participated  
 in the deal and 0 otherwise
Time to exit Time (expressed in years) that company needed to exit
Deal size Amount of funds raised in the funding round 
Total amount raised before exit Total amount of funds raised by a company before exit
Multiples (log) Natural log of the multiples
IRR (log) Natural log for gross IRRs
Number of rounds Number of rounds that company received before exit
Round number The number of round at the time of investment 
Industry dummies 
Energy & Other Dummy variable equal to 1 if company operating in Energy & Other sector
Healthcare & Medical Dummy variable equal to 1 if company operating in Healthcare & Medical sector
ICT Dummy variable equal to 1 if company operating in ICT sector
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Figure 23: Cash in-to-valuation multiples 2000-2009 – Number of deals 
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